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FAMILY LAW
John W. Brand, Jr.*
Dan Hopson, Jr.**
The past two years found the Kansas Supreme Court, almost exclusively,
reiterating the doctrines expressed in the main stream of prior Family Law
cases. A few fact situations presented troublesome eddies and at one point the
court created two streams winding in opposite directions. As in past years the
bulk of the cases concerned the rights of adults to children, the support of




Although In re Estate of Shirk' represents a novel problem, it further illus-
trates the continuing conflict between the role of the state as parens patrae and
the hallowed right of freedom of contract.' In Shirk, a mother agreed to con-
sent to the adoption of her child by the child's grandmother in exchange for
the grandmother's agreeing: (1) to consent to the mother adopting back her
child when the mother became financially able, (2) to give the child by will a
child's share of the grandmother's estate and (3) not to disinherit the mother.
Subsequently, the grandmother adopted the child. Still later the mother re-
adopted. At the death of the grandmother, the mother sought to enforce the
agreement. The executor claimed that the agreement was void as against
public policy. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the claim, but the supreme
court reversed. After agreeing that one could not "sell" his child for gain, the
court found several outs which render the opinion a bit weak as precedent.
Underlying the court's decision was the fact that it must have felt that the
motives of the mother were pure. It spent considerable time discussing the fact
that the grandmother (the purchaser of the child) was "in the family" and had
prepared the deal, and that the mother was unable, financially and emotionally,
to care for the child. In short, the court felt that this contract was in the best
interests of the child. Technically, the court relied on the fact that the agree-
ment provided a monetary advantage to the child, while the only monetary
*Member of the firm of Stevens, Brand & Brand, Lawrence, Kansas. A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1959, The
University of Kansas.
" Associate Professor of Law, The University of Kansas. A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1953, The University of
Kansas; LL.M. 1954, Yale Law School.
S186 Kan. 311, 350 P.2d 1 (1960).
'Other such conflicts were resolved in Hawes v. Rhodes, 179 Kan. 716, 298 P.2d 276 (1956) and
Wilson v. Kansas Children's Home, 159 Kan. 325, 154 P.2d 137 (1944). Cf. In re Thompson, 178 Kan.
127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955). Grunder v. Grunder, 186 Kan. 766, 352 P.2d 1067 (1960), discussed infra
circa note 134, presents another extreme example of this conflict.
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gain to the mother was a promise by the grandmother not to disinherit. The
court distinguished a Georgia case8 which held a contract void because mone-
tary benefits flowed to the mother. It purported to follow another Georgia
case4 where the benefits flowed only to the child. But in Shirk, both mother
and child benefitted so actually neither case was in point.
On balance, the case represents the oft held view that courts protect the
weaker party. Here the grandmother Was dead and had disinherited both the
mother and child. The court did not want to find illegality. But attorneys
should be careful. They dare not assume that the court will feel bound by this
case when an attorney has advised a mother that she can sell her child through
an agreement providing some extrabenefit to the child.
Custody
In Bolinder v. Borkert, a trial court order awarding custody of a minor
child to non-parent habeas corpus petitioners, was affirmed. Both parents were
out of the picture. An aunt prevailed over a great-aunt. The court reaffirmed'
the principal that the primary issue in such a proceeding is the present and
future welfare"of the child. And this is a factual matter for the trial court.
Previous 'to the habeas corpus proceeding the appellant filed a petition for
guardianship in the probate court. Appellant contended that this gave the
probate court jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the district court. The supreme
court said no-for two reasons. First, the probate court proceedings were in-
valid. No letters of guardianship were ever issued. But assuming the guardian-
ship proceedings were valid, the court suggested that even then the district
court and not the probate court had jurisdiction. Habeas corpus is a proceeding
to test the legality of the restraint of one's liberty. The probate code was not
intended to deny its use where child custody is involved. The court cited
Johnson v. Best,7 where a mother used habeas corpus to recover her child from
an appointed guardian. In Johnson the restraint was keeping the child from
her mother and natural guardian. But in Bolinder the restraint of liberty was
a custody arrangement that was not for the child's best welfare. Habeas corpus
may have been the logical. remedy, but the court, in effect, said that when the
custody arrangement is not for the child's best welfare, then the child's liberty
is being restrained. The dicta may broaden the use of habeas corpus in these
situations. It certainly makes insecure probate court attempts to gain custody.'
The court, following Heilman v. Heilman. said a guardian ad litem for the
child was not necessary. All parties were in court, with the exception of the
8 Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Hanley, 208 Ga. 34, 65 S.E.2d 26'(1951).
Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolff, 191 Ga. 111, 11 S.E.2d 766 (1940).185 Kan. 201, 341 P.2d 1033 (1959).
*See Paronto v. Armstrong, 161 Kan. 720, 724, 171 P.2d 299, 301 (1946).156 Kan. 668, 135 P.2d 896 (1943).
8 Cf. Robben v. Robben, 188 Kan. 217, 362 P.2d 29 (1961), discussed infra circa note 35.
* 181 Kan. 467, 312 P.2d 622 (1956).
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mother. Her whereabouts was unknown, but plaintiffs had obtained publication
service upon her. The Heilman case was a custody action., But extension of the
Heilman rule to habeas corpus hearings is logical.
Child Custody and the Conflict of Laws
In five cases decided during this survey period and in a lead case from the
preceding period the Kansas Supreme Court was forced to wrestle with the
perplexing problem of the jurisdiction of various Kansas courts to determine
custody rights. Generally the court treated each case, as so frequently happens
in child custody matters, as sui generis. Consequently precedent was badly
mangled although a somewhat consistent result may be detected.
As reported in the 1959 Survey, 0 the court, in Leach'v. Leach," held that
a Kansas District Court in a divorce case loses jurisdiction to enter a new
custody order under KAN. G.S. 1959 Supp., 60-1510, when the parent, who has
custody, and the child are no longer domiciled in Kansas. The court relied on
Kruse V. Kruse2 which had denied continuing jurisdiction to a Missouri court
when, prior to the order changing custody, the child became domiciled in
Kansas. In the Kruse case, the court relied on 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws"§
144.3 (1935), to the effect that without domicile a court loses continuing
jurisdiction.
IThen in two cases decided the same day, Neccum v. Lawrence"8 and
Hannon v. Hannon,'4 the court reaffirmed its stand that a Kansas district
court loses jurisdiction to determine custody when the child has been removed
to another state by the parent having custody, since the child acquires a new
domicile." In Neccum the mother had custody and was domiciled in Kansas
City, Missouri. She was induced to turn over her child to her husband on the
basis of an ex parte order of temporary custody granted to the father by the
court which had originally entered the custody order. Consequently the child
was in Kansas at the time of the order charging permanent custody. However,
the court found the temporary order void, since the child was not domiciled
in Kansas. Therefore the child was not "domiciled" (although physically
present), in Kansas at the time of the permanent order. In Hannon, the father
had received custody in the original divorce action. After the mother had
obtained an increased and definite visitation right, the father took the child to
Oklahoma, where he, apparently, was maintaining a domicile." Then the
mother obtained an order from the court that had granted the divorce, -giving
'5Casad, Family Law, 8 KAN. L. REv. 288, 294 (1959).184 Kan. 335, 336 P.2d 425 (1959).
'5150 Kan. 946, 96 P.2d 849 (1939).
'5186 Kan. 223, 350 P.2d 133 (1960).
, 186 Kan. 231, 350 P.2d 26 (1960).
'5The child's domicile is traditionally considered to be that of the parent having custody.
The child had been living with a grandmother in Kansas.
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her temporary custody. A motion by the father to set aside this order was
sustained by the trial court on the grounds that the child was no longer domi-
ciled in Kansas. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, concluding that with-
out domicile, the Kansas court had no power. The court suggested that the
situation was a mess, but that "some court of competent jurisdiction will be
able to provide for its welfare and custody."1
The next case, Price v. Price," raised the problem in a different setting and
illustrates the limitations on the Leach, Neccum and Hannon cases. In Price
the father had been given custody by a Delaware court at the divorce of the
parties. The mother kidnapped the child and brought her to Kansas where the
mother and child now live. The father, in a habeas corpus action, was granted
custody by the Kansas district court against the contentions of the mother that
there had been changed circumstances entitling her to increased visitation
rights. 9 The supreme court cited the language of Wear v. Wear" that "the
jurisdiction of the trial court... to determine what disposition should be made
of the child ... did not depend on the domicile of the child, nor on the domicile
of either of its parents,"'" and held that the mother had not shown any change
of circumstances. Therefore, under the evidence presented the father was en-
titled to custody with no change in visitation rights. The court pointed out,
citing White v. White,22 that the Delaware decree must be given weight and
since the mother had not shown why the Delaware decree should be changd,
the father should be given the child.
Certainly, on its face, Price does not follow, either in its language or in its
holding, the domicile requirement of Leach et al. The supreme court, in the
last paragraph of the Price opinion, without mentioning the word domicile
does admit that there are two lines of cases but suggests that the facts and
circumstances are different. The court points out that one line of cases2" cite
2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 144.3, while the other line24 cites 2 BEALE, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 147.1. The court also cites EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
Part One § 87, pp. 281, 284 (1959) for a discussion of the "Kansas Rule."
BEALE does not offer much help. Section 144.3 suggests that only domicile
is the proper jurisdictional base while section 147.1 argues that a custody award
17 186 Kan. 231, 233, 350 P.2d 26, 28.
187 Kan. 292, 356 P.2d 1013 (1960).
"The case is somewhat clouded as to its actual holding since the mother, in her answer, requested a
change of custody. On appeal she complained of the refusal of the trial court to change visitation rights.
The court points out that she now does not object to the custody holding and, since this was the issue
under the pleading, there is no issue presented for review. However the court goes on to decide whether
the trial court properly denied a change in visitation rights. In so deciding, the court makes no suggestion
that they would treat a change in visitation rights in a different manner than a change in custody.
20 130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac. 606 (1930).
'Price v. Price, 187 Kan. at 295, 356 P.2d at 1016, quoting Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. at 224, 285
Pac. at 615.
a 160 Kan. 32, 159 P.2d 461 (1945).
Neccum, Leach, et al.
Wear, White, a al.
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in a first state, having jurisdiction, will be recognized in a second state and in
order to change custody the second state will have to show changed circum-
stances.
Professor Ehrenzweig's discussion, cited above, of the "Kansas Rule" is
much more enlightening. Written prior to the cases under discussion, Pro-
fessor Ehrenzweig argues that in the custody area concepts of full faith and
credit and domicile are particularly unworkable and, although courts use
traditional domicile-res language, many have taken the earlier Kansas position
that the state under its power as parens patrae may always do what is best for
the child. He cites the Wear case2" as establishing the Kansas Rule." Certainly
Leach, Neccum et al, with their emphasis on domicile, would seem to over-
rule the freedom of Wear. But Price, without discussion, says there is a distinc-
tion.
It would unduly extend this survey article to detail the possible future
position of the Kansas court in this area. 7 However, it would appear that the
following distinctions can be made.2"
If faced with a foreign decree awarding custody, the Kansas court will take
jurisdiction whether the child is domiciled here or not (but assuming the
child is physically present) and will retain for itself the right to determine
custody in the best interests of the child.2" If the child was brought here by
the person not entitled to custody under the foreign decree, the court, while
maintaining its right to change custody on the best interests theory, will not do
so unless a strong case of changed circumstances can be made.3  If, however,
the child is properly brought into Kansas by one lawfully having custody and
becomes domiciled here, a foreign decree entered by the court originally grant-
ing custody changing that custody, will not be given effect. The Kansas court
will feel free to act in the best interests of the child. This is particularly true
where the first state's change order was entered as punishment for removing
the child.31
On the other hand, there are the cases where the natural custody of the
parents was disturbed by a Kansas court in a divorce decree. Here the court,
relying on a case involving a foreign custody decree, 2 held that the Kansas
court loses jurisdiction if domicile no longer exists.3 But even the rule of
Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac. 606 (1930).
=See also Johnstone, Child Custody, 1 KAN. L. REV. 37, 165 (1953) for an explanation of the
"Kansas Rule" prior to these late cases.
A future issue of the KANsAs LAw REviEw will contain a student comment on these cases.
, Incidentally these distinctions seem to follow the discussion in EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWs,
Part One, SS 86, 87 (1959) as to what the courts are doing in fact, despite their language.
" Wear v. Wear, supra note 20.
'Price v. Price, 187 Kan. 292, 356 P.2d 1013 (1960); In re Thompson, 178 Kan. 1, 282 P.2d 440
(1955); White v. White, 160 Kan. 32, 159 P.2d 461 (1945).
tmSee, e.g., Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946, 96 P.2d 849 (1939).Ibid.
MHannon v. Hannon, 186 Kan. 231, 350 P.2d 26 (1960); Neccum v. Lawrence, 186 Kan 223, 350
P.2d 133 (1960); Leach v. Leach, 184 Kan. 335, 336 P.2d 425 (1959).
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Leach et a is modified by the holdings in Dufiy v. Dufly and In re Heilman8
which are not mentioned in Leach et al. There the court, without discussing
the domicile concept, held that where a parent steals the child away either
prior to or after a Kansas custody decree, the Kansas, court does not lose juris-
diction even if technical domicile no longer exists in Kansas. In Leach et al
the domicile of the child had been changed by the leaving parent without
kidnapping.
The court's increased emphasis on domicile, dictated the result in ,the last
two cases in this period. In 'Robben v. Robben"5 the court required domicile
for the appointment of the guardian of the estate of a child. The child was
domiciled in Ohio with the mother. The father was domiciled in Colorado.
After the mother's death the child moved in with an uncle living in Great
Bend. The uncle obtained a probate court guardianship appointment (of the
'estate only). He then filed a motion in the original divorce action between
the parents asking for back child support payments and an increase. The court,
following Kansas law,8" found that upon death of the mother custody auto-
matically transferred to the father and consequently the child's domicile
shifted to Colorado. Without domicile, the Kansas probate court had no juris-
diction to appoint a guardian of the estate. Since the appointment was void, he
:had no standing to ask for child support." Apparently it made no difference
whether the guardianship of the person or of the.estate is involved. Domicile
is now king.8
In Love v. Love, 9 parents who 'had a claim to custody sought, through
habeas corpus, to obtain their child from an uncle who had previously been
granted custody. The parents sought the order from the Johnson County Dis-
trict Court and obtained in personam jurisdiction over the uncle by personally
serving him in Johnson County. The uncle and the child were domiciled in
Leavenworth County. The court, without reaching the merits and relying on
some earlier criminal habeas corpus cases, held that the Johnson County court
lacked Venue to issue the habeas corpus since the status of the child was a res
and its location was at the child's domicile.
Although these last two cases may be correctly decided as to the result, it
is unfortunate :that the court, now so imbued with domicile, uses this type of
"Duffy v. Duffy, 176 Kan. 112, 268 P.2d 931 (1954). In re Heilman, 176 Kan., 5' 269 P.2d 459
(1954),-'cert. denied; 348 U.S. 944 (1955). For further discussion of these cases and .the need for in
personam jurisdiction under May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952), see Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN.
L. REV. 224, 228 (1955). See also, Comiment, 5 KAN. L. REv. 77 (1956) for further discussion' of the
Maycase.
,n 188 Kan. 217, 362.P.2d 29 (1961).
W The court admitted that Ohio law was pertinent, but neither party had cited Ohio law, so the"court
assumed it to be the same as Kansas law. '
'The court relied on Jagger v. Rader, 134 Kan. 570, 7 P.2d 114 (1932), which had required domicile
for the appointment of a guardian. But in Jagger only venue was in issue.
" What should the uncle now do? He cannot obtain support for the girl. Surely he is -under no
obligation to support her himself. How does the child get supported?
188 Kan. 185, 360 P.2d 1061 (1961). '
[Vol. 10
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legalistic conceptualism as a basis of its holding. With the United.States
Supreme Court talking about in personam rights :and the Kansas Supreme
Court talking about domicile, proper jurisdiction and venue may be difficult
to obtain. To do justice in a custody'matter is now .extremely difficult. The
imposition of legalistic conceptualistic technicalities which allow for protracted
litigation does not aid the child.
Torts and Contracts
Dougan, Adm'x v. McGrew"' is a welcome case. How is a minor defendant
served in an in personam action, when his natural guardian, a nonrefident, can-
not be served in Kansas, or with valid process in the state of his residence?
Previously, many considered that this question lacked an answer. KAN. G.S.
1949, 69-408, providing for service on minors, states in, part "If there be a
natural or legally appointed guardian for such minor,,... service shall also be.
made in the same manner upon such guardian." If the statute was interpreted
literally, both minor and guardian had to be served in the same manner. If the
guardian was a nonresident this was impossible., Earlier cases seem to say just
this, particularly Hurd v. Baty.42 Dougan clears the fog. Pointing out that the
legislature could not have intended, to confer immunity on this type of de-
fendant, the court stated that service on the minor defendant alone was suffi-
dent. The plaintiff had procured, the service of summons on the defendant's
father in Jackson County, Missouri,. under KAN, G.S. 1949, 69-2529. The, court
approved this procedure as "sound practice." In Walker v. Gray4" the same
question arose. The court relied on the Dougan decision.
Farran v. Peterson, Adm'r" is primarily a pleading case. But the case does
reaffirm two principles, in this area. The statute of limitations does not run
against a minor during the period of his minority." And contributory negli-
gence on the part of a minor's parent or guardian may not be imputed to the
minor.4"
In Ehrsam v. Borgen47 a passenger sued a twenty year old owner-driver for
personal injuries. The parties commuted to work and had entered into a share-
the-ride arrangement. The defendant, in his answer, stated that he disaffirmed
any such share-the-ride arrangement and alleged that at the time of the acci-
dent the plaintiff was a guest in defendant's vehicle. At the parties' request at
a pre-trial conference the trial judge ruled on the legal effect of the defendant's
'May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952); Comment, 5 KAN. L. Rav. 77 (1956).
187 Kan. 410, 357 P.2d 319 (1960).
' 149 Kan. 665, 88 P.2d 1031 (1939).
187 Kan. 471, 357 P.2d 800 (1960).
"185 Kan. 154, 342 P.2d 180 (1959).
"Domann v. Pence, 183 Kan. 196, 326 P.2d 260 (1958).
"Garcia v. Slater-Breitag-Yeamans Motor Co.i 128 Kan. 365, 278 Pac. 23 (1929).
" 185 Kan. 776, 346 P.2d 260 (1959).
1961]
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disaflirmance. He relied on Brown v. Wood,48 a Michigan case, which held that
if to hold an infant liable in tort would in effect enforce his liability arising
out of a connected and voidable contract, then the infant cannot be held liable
for his tort, since he cannot be held liable under his contract. By applying the
Brown case the trial judge must have reasoned that, if the minor driver received
contractual benefits from the agreement and if his duty under negligence law
to transport the passenger safely was identical to his contractual obligation to
transport safely, then when his contractual obligation was initiated by the dis-
affirmance, any identical tort duties disappeared. In the trial judge's opinion
this placed the facts within the guest statute. The supreme court reversed, hold-
ing that transportation to work was a necessity and that therefore the conract
could not be disaffirmed. Brown v. Wood has never been applied in Kansas.
Our court merely commented that it had no application to the present case.
Someone will probably raise the question again someday.
ANNULMENT
A spouse seeking annulment on the ground of a prior subsisting marriage'
of the other party must establish the prior marriage "by proof so cogent as
to compel conviction." In Harper v. Dupree," the trial court had admitted
certificates of bonded abstractors from certain counties stating that their district
court records failed to show any divorce proceedings between the defendant and
a previous husband. In reversing, the court held such certificates inadmissable
as not the best evidence.5" They went on to state that the husband's evidence
was not good against a demurrer, even with the certificates. The presumption
of the validity of the second marriage is "one of the strongest known to the
law." The evidence to overcome the presumption must be so conclusive as to
fairly preclude any other result. Parts of the plaintiff's "unconclusive evidence"
demonstrate the court's point. The husband testified that the wife told him that
the prior divorce was obtained in El Dorado. The abstractor's certificate failed
to show such a divorce." To prove his case in a negative manner by proving
no divorce anywhere, the plaintiff simply had to close every door. He under-
took the task in an impossible manner. We must conclude that evidence to
"fairly preclude any other result" simply means direct evidence that the prior
marriage was still valid.
DIVORCE
Grounds
Since parties seldom litigate either the law or the evidence on grounds for
'
8 293 Mich. 148, 291 N.W. 255 (1940).
4g 185 Kan. 483, 345 P.2d 644 (1959).
0 The supreme court, in effect, said that the best evidence was court records.
m In upholding the wife, the court had to call her a liar.
[Vol. 10
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divorce, appeals to the supreme court are few. Usually, on the rare appeal, only
the sufficiency of the evidence is questioned as a means of upsetting an un-
favorable property or alimony decree.52 However, on occasion, an appeal, even
though grounded in materialism, will produce important "new" law or will
prove, once again, that the law can do justice. In Bariuan v. Bariuan," the court
used a carelessly drawn journal entry to upset a divorce decree. A Filipino wife
had tried to defend herself without aid of counsel. The court was unable to
find the grounds for divorce. The procedural aspect of this case is discussed
infra under Pleading and Practice.
Crosby v. Crosby 4 is potentially the most important case in this survey
area. But to understand the case, background is needed. Back in 1940 an attorney
tried to convince the Kansas court that an adjudication of insanity was a de-
fense in a divorce action. In Toepifer v. Toep fer,5 the court said no. It held
that you could rebut an adjudication of insanity and that the test was whether:
".... [T]he person charged with the marital wrong was capable, at the time,
of comprehending and understanding the wrong he was committing.""6 Or, as
stated another way in the opinion, the divorce should be granted: " . .. [P]ro-
vided the condition of the defendant's mind was such as to enable him to know
the nature and understand the consequences of his marital wrongs at the time
they were committed." 7
Then in 1955, in Lindbloom v. Lindbloom,8 the supreme court reversed a
trial court that had divorced the parties for the wife's gross neglect and which
had granted the husband custody of the children. She had been in and out of
mental institutions and apparently had not looked after either the house or
the children properly. The court excused her behavior toward the children on
the ground that it was "obviously brought about by her illness, which affected
her emotions and moods'....,"9
Considering whether the defendant in his cross-petition had proved gross
neglect, the court pointed out that gross neglect was more than just neglect"
and, quoting from the first syllabus of Franklin v. Franklin,"' said that when a
person was temporarily insane "[T]he evidence showing an intentional deser-
tion... must be clear, convincing, and uncontradicted, and it must appear that
r'Such a case is Bremer v. Bremer, 187 Kan. 225, 356 P.2d 672 (1960). The parties were divorced
for the husband's extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty. On appeal the husband complained of the
property awards but added a complaint as to the sufficiency of the grounds. The court refused to find
error and said: "There was ample evidence of new acts of cruelty and neglect to revive the former acts
which may have been condoned by the dismissal of the former divorce case." Id. at 228, 356 P.2d at 674.
r' 186 Kan. 605, 352 P.2d 29 (1960).
186 Kan. 420, 350 P.2d 796 (1960).
t 151 Kan. 924, 101 P.2d 904 (1940).MId. at 928, 101 P.2d at 907.
RId. at 926, 101 P.2d at 906.
177 Kan. 286, 279 P.2d 243 (1955).
Mid at 297, 279 P.2d at 251.
oThe court cited Smith v. Smith, 22 Kan. 699 (1879).
6 53 Kan. 143, 35 Pac. 1118 (1894).
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such abandonment was not the result of the plaintiff's own wrongdoing." 2
The court then added: "While in this case plaintiff was never adjudicated in-
sane, we think the rule stated in the authority last quoted is applicable. What
she had was an illness which affected the 'emotions and the moods' for which
she was treated as the necessity therefor arose.""3 Apparently the supreme
court was saying that when the wife was ill and this illness affected her emotions
and;moods, she was not to be held. responsible for her marital wrongs-here,
gross neglect.
A little earlier in the opinion, the court also raised this interesting analogy.
The court said: "If a wife should become ill of tuberculosis, cancer, or other
disease and would be unable to perform her household duties as well as she
ordinarily would perform them, we would not be willing to say that the
husband was entitled to a divorce because of that situation."' 4
This case, was not too shocking. A commentator could explain it as an
extreme example of the Kansas courts' protection of mother love. Although
the supreme court had reversed the trial court on the divorce, it had spent
most of its time about custody and her right to the children.
But then in the spring of 1960 the court decided Crosby v. Crosby. 5 Mrs.
Crosby had. been happily married for some time. Then, in 1948, she started
having mental troubles. She was treated at both Menninger's and a hospital
in Kansas City. She drank excessively. In 1955 Mr. Crosby sued for divorce.
There was a reconciliation and a post-nuptial agreement. Later her conduct
deteriorated, and he again filed for divorce. She contested. Dr. Modlin, a psy-
chiatrist from Menninger's, testified that she was mentally ill. There was no
suggestion that she was insane and certainly she had never been adjudicated
insane." The trial court granted the divorce on the basis of her gross neglect
and the supreme court again reversed. The court admitted that there was
sufficient evidence of gross neglect, but argued that Lindbloom 7 controlled.
The court quoted the language in Lindbloom about the equivalency of mental
illness and cancer. The syllabus said: "It is the duty of a husband to provide and
care for his wife in her illness as well as in her health.""8 A bit later in the
opinion the court suggested that when a wife had a mental illness affecting her
emotions and moods, that was sufficiently serious to require treatment in well-
' 177 Kan. at 296, 279 P.2d at 250. Actually the cited case is more in point than the quoted syllabus
would indicate. In the Franklin case the wife had been in and out of an "insane asylum." Later, after a
fight with her husband, she went home to mother. The court said: "We do not think that husbands who
have wives so afflicted should be encouraged to seek to be rid of them, but rather should be held to a more
strict performance of their marital duties." 53 Kan. 143, 145, 35 Pac. 1118, 1119 (1894).0 5Lindbloom v. Lindbloom, 177 Kan. 286, 297, 279 P.2d 243, 250 (1955).
oId. at 296, 279 P.2d at 250.
"186 Kan. 420, 350 P.2d 796 (1960).
"The supreme court quoted Dr. Modlin's testimony at the trial that Mrs. Crosby's symptoms showed
"[A] very good description of what is ordinarily thought of as Manic Depressive reactions, Hyper Manic
type." 186 Kan. 420, 424, 350 P.2d 796, 799.
"Lindbloom v. Lindbloom, supra note 58.
"177 Kan. at 286, 279 P.2d at 243.
[Vol. 10
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known mental institutions, and when this illness was the real cause of the
acts of misconduct relied on by the husband as constituting gross neglect of
duty... the husband has not shown a cause of action for divorce.
The rationale of Crosby is, technically, explainable on either of two theories:
(1) That intent is a necessary element in gross neglect and that a "mental
problem" is a defense since it destroys that intent, or (2) That contract law
theories control marriage, i.e. that a marriage contract is for better or worse and
if the worse is emotional and not based upon "fault," the court will find no
breach of contract when the disturbed spouse misbehaves.
Apart from basic theory, these cases raise several questions. Note that in
both cases the supreme court talked in terms of gross neglect. Will this doc-
trine carry over to other grounds, particularly cruelty? Gross neglect and
cruelty are the most commonly used grounds in Kansas and our supreme
court tends to mix the two together so that they are almost indistinguishable.69
There is some authority in other jurisdictions7" that this doctrine extends into
cruelty and perhaps other areas.
But in whatever area the court applies the doctrine it will probably back
off from the full implication of these cases. In any situation, where the parties
are not getting along, and someone wants out, there are emotional difficulties
or there would not be fights, drinking, going out with other women, and other
actions considered to be misconduct. If the court would extend this doctrine to
its logical extreme, no one could ever obtain a divorce if the defendant con-
tested. The defendant could claim that she misbehaved because of emotional
difficulties. Perhaps the court will work out some sort of rough scale with the
amount of insanity inversely proportionate to the degree of fault. In other
words, the more the defendant misbehaved the greater the amount of "emo-
tional difficulties" that will have to be shown. Also some distinction between
actual illness (psychosis) and neurosis may be forthcoming. The court will
probably be forced to find a lower limit. Taking the language of the court at
face value, it would seem that the court is adopting the Durham rule, which
states that there is no criminal responsibility when the conduct is the "product"
of a mental illness-a test emphatically rejected in criminal matters in the
recent Andrews case.71
From a practical point of view Lindbloom and Crosby leave room for some
tactics that may not be desirable. In Kansas practice, almost any plaintiff that
'See, e.g., Kelso v. Kelso, 182 Kan. 665, 342 P.2d 165 (1958); Hayn v. Hayn, 172 Kan. 189, 175
P.2d 127 (1946). Cf. Hoppe v. Hoppe, 181 Kan. 428, 312 P.2d 215 (1957), where the court merely
states that there is evidence to support both a finding of gross neglect and extreme cruelty.
"Nelson v. Nelson, 108 Ohio App. 365, 154 N.E.2d 653 (1958), but compare Ford v. Ford, 200 Va.
674, 107 $.E.2d 397 (1959) where the wife could not prove insanity.
"aState v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739 (1960). For additional views as to the meaning of
the Crosby case and for citations from other states see Note, 10 KAN. L. REV. 95 (1961).
1961]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
wants a divorce can have one. The district courts denied 29 and granted 4,617
divorces during the year ending June 30, 1959."2 In 1960 the courts granted
4,962 divorces and denied only 31."2 For the year ending June 30, 1961, an all-
time high was reached. There were 5,060 divorces and 13 denials!74 The statistics
have varied but little since World War II. The classical defenses are seldom
used and when used are seldom successful. Still the possibility of a trial is a
serious bargaining device when a property settlement is discussed. Spouses
fear a public airing of their marriage. And the parties worry, probably un-
justifiably, that a contest may jeopardize their chances of getting a divorce.
With these new cases a mentally disorganized or disturbed spouse can threaten
to have the psychiatrist testify if a proper settlement is not forthcoming.
Actually the Lindbloom and Crosby cases and a few like them in other
jurisdictions represent the first attempts by the courts to recognize that divorce
and the "causes" of divorce are not adequately handled by courts and lawyers.
Ultimately lawyers and judges will have to work out some other system or
else radically improve the judicial procedures in the divorce area.
Pleading and Practice
A petition and a summons stating that the plaintiff wife seeks "support
money and division of property" is sufficient to support a divorce judgment
awarding alimony. In Craig v. Craig"5 the trial court had sustained defendant's
motion to quash the alimony judgment on grounds that the petition made
no reference to alimony and that the defendant had no notice that plaintiff
was asking for alimony. In reversing, the supreme court said that the words
"support money" gave the defendant fair warning that his wife was seeking
alimony."
Hodge v. Hodge7" is a significant case. Can a wife attack and upset a prop-
erty settlement agreement that she, herself, submitted to the divorce court, on
the ground that the husband failed to inform her of the true extent of his
property at the time the agreement was signed? The Hodge case holds that she
may. Rosella Hodge filed a petition under KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-3007, Fourth,
to set aside an alimony judgment in her divorce suit on the ground of fraud
practiced by her ex-husband. She alleged that he had prevailed upon her to
file a cross-petition asking for a divorce and to submit the property settlement
agreement to the trial court for approval; that he misrepresented to her the
value of a corporation, in which he was the principal stockholder; and that he
"' Kan. Judicial Council Bull., Table A-4, p. 25 (Oct. 1959).
"Judicial Council Table A-4, p. 2 8 (Oct. 1960).
SJudicial Council Table A-4, p. 2 6 (Oct. 1961).
7 187 Kan. 691, 359 P.2d 842 (1961).
6 The court justified this holding, in part, on the grounds that KAm. G.S. 1949, 60-1511 requires the
granting of alimony. The court cited Garver v. Garver, 184 Kan. 145, 334 P.2d 408 (1959). See circa
note 110, infra.
186 Kan. 361, 349 P.2d 947 (1960).
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prevailed upon her to consult with his attorney and by-pass independent legal
advice. The trial court's order overruling the husband's demurrer was affirmed.
The supreme court denominates the alleged fraud as extrinsic 7-meaning
fraud that has prevented a fair presentation or submission of the controversy.
KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1511, provides that upon divorce for the husband's fault
there shall be a fair and just division of the property acquired during marriage.
As interpreted, this means that an equitable division of jointly acquired prop-
erty is mandatory.7" The trial court had to make a fair division of the property.
The court reasoned that the fraud prevented a proper inquiry into the extent
and value of the property involved. The fraud was extrinsic; without it the
judgment would have been different.
By so reasoning our supreme court draws an even finer line between ex-
trinsic and intrinsic fraud. Mathey v. Mathey was a similar action, brought
under 60-3007, Fourth. There the plaintiff wife alleged that her ex-husband
had falsely testified about his property during the trial. A demurrer to the
petition was sustained. The court described the fraud as intrinsic. After review-
ing many definitions of the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud,
the court observed that "'extrinsic fraud' relates to acts which prevent a fair
presentation of a controversy, and . . . 'intrinsic' fraud relates to acts which
prevent a fair determination of the issues once a court had a controversy before
it.""0 The court in Mathey, quoting from 31 AM. JUR. Judgments § 54, p. 230,
also said "Fraud has been regarded as intrinsic, within the meaning of the rule,
where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action,
or where the acts constituting the fraud were, or could have been, litigated
therein."si It certainly could be argued that the Hodge fraud fell within the
Mathey definition. The acts pertained to an issue involved in the action-the
division of property. The acts constituting the fraud could have been litigated
in the divorce suit.
Obviously, there is a distinction. When one party has falsely testified in
court, his opponent has the opportunity for cross-examination. As the Mathey
case pointed out, to allow collateral attack or perjured testimony would result
in endless litigation in which nothing would be finally determined. 2 Further-
more, in the absence of shown unfairness or overreaching, a trial court lacks
discretion to disapprove a property settlement agreement.8" The dividing line
can best be drawn on the facts. If the deceit is practiced in court, Mathey would
" Fraud is sometimes classified as extrinsic or intrinsic. The court cites: Mathey v. Mathey, 179 Kan. 284,
294 P.2d 202 (1956) and Stafford v. Stafford, 163 Kan. 162, 181 P.2d 491 (1947) for the distinction.
"Garver v. Garver, 184 Kan. 145, 194, 334 P.2d 408 (1959), see circa note 110 infra for other effects
of Garver.
' Mathey v. Mathey, 179 Kan. 284, 290, 294 P.2d 202, 207 (1956).
t id. at 289, 294 P.2d at 206.
aId. at 291, 294 P.2d at 207.
'Petty v. Petty, 147 Kan. 342, 76 P.2d 850 (1938).
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still seem to apply. The fraud would be intrinsic and not subject to collateral
attack. But if the fraud was practiced outside of court and ultimately prevented
a fair determination-even if the court later passed on and approved its fruits-
the fraud would be extrinsic. The court did fail to verbally distinguish between
misrepresentation and fraud (knowing misrepresentation). Factually, the
plaintiff had alleged knowledge of the defendant's misrepresentations. Later
courts may quickly retreat when the husband has not made statements with a
fraudulent purpose.
The case serves several important warnings. Willful failure of the husband
either to tell all or to tell the truth at the time of entering into a property agree-
ment appears to be adequate grounds for collateral attack. When property is
involved both parties should have legal counsel. Under the Hodge case trial
courts might properly view with suspicion any property settlement entered
into without the aid and advice of an attorney. The Hodge case provides ample
reason to specifically advise a client that without a complete and truthful dis-
closure about property by the husband, the litigants may some day find them-
selves back in court on this same question. But the case is most significant for
the husband divorce client and his attorney seeking to use a property settlement
agreement to avoid a detailed judicial inquiry into the client's financial ar-
rangements. The agreement will be subject to attack for the statutory period."4
An inquiry into the extent of the property will be the very basis of the attack.
And if the wife is not aware of all the property at the time of agreement, all
property will be subject to judicial scrutiny.
Bariuan v. Bariuan5 is probably one of the most interesting cases reported
during this period. The defendant wife was a resident of the Phillipine Islands.
She filed an answer, pro se, but was not present at time of trial. The trial court
entered judgment granting the husband a divorce and bastardizing the parties'
four year old son. The supreme court declared the judgment void. The order
bastardizing the child was outside the pleadings. The plaintiff had failed to
request such a finding in his petition. The journal entry stated that the relief
prayed for in plaintiff's petition should be granted. Plaintiff alleged gross
neglect of duty and extreme cruelty. The supreme court said, "From other parts
of the journal entry of judgment it would be reasonably inferred that either
the First or Fifth grounds for divorce specified in G. S. 1949, 60-1501 had been
attempted to be proved. Nowhere in plaintiff's petition are to be found any
indication of such charges." This might be interpreted as a warning against
the oft-used journal entry phrase, "The plaintiff should be granted the relief
prayed for in his petition." But the equities were so heavily on the appellant's
s' Two years. See KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-3008.
"186 Kan. 605, 352 P.2d 29 (1960).
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side that such a conclusion is unjustified. The court also discussed the strong
presumption of legitimacy as to a child born in lawful wedlock.
King v. King,"8 although involving a problem of full faith and credit to a
California divorce decree, is important for its discussion of proper procedure
under KAN. G.S. 1949, 69-1516 and -1518. After the parties were denied a Kansas
divorce,"7 the wife moved to California. She then filed suit in Kansas for sepa-
rate maintenance under KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1516. While this suit was pending
and after her husband filed an answer and cross-petition for divorce in the
separate maintenance action, the wife obtained a California divorce on con-
structive service. She then set up the California decree as an answer to her
husband's cross-petition. She also asked, at this point, for the court to determine
alimony and property rights under KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1518."s The husband
moved to strike the answer and reply which the trial court sustained.
The supreme court traced the history of KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1518 and pointed
out that the statute required recognition of foreign divorce, prior to the time
the United States Supreme Court required it in Williams v. North Carolina."9
Since recognition of the California decree, if valid, is required, it was improper
to strike the answer. It made no difference that the California suit was started
subsequent to the Kansas suit. The court with the first decree controls." The
court then pointed out that KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1518 allows suit in Kansas for
alimony and a division of property, despite the foreign divorce decree. The
court, following Fencham v. Fencham,91 said that no specific procedure is set
out for such recovery and that use of a prior suit under KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1516
was a proper vehicle, nor was the statute passed to protect only defendants in
the foreign action. 2
'o 185 Kan. 742, 347 P.2d 381 (1959).
87 See King v. King, 183 Kan. 406, 327 P.2d 856 (1958).
soThis section reads: "A judgment or decree of divorce rendered in any other state or territory of the
United States, in conformity with the laws thereof, shall be given full faith and credit in this state;
except, that in the event the defendant in such action, at the time of such judgment or decree, was a
resident of this state and had not been served personally with process, or did not personally appear or
defend the action in the court of such state or territory, all matters relating to alimony, and to the property
rights of the parties and to the custody and maintenance of the minor children of the parties, shall be
subject to inquiry and determination in any proper action or proceeding brought in the courts of this
state within two years after the date of the foreign judgment or decree, to the same extent as though
the foreign judgment or decree had not been rendered."
s317 U.S. 387 (1942). The court also cites the second Williams case, 325 U.S. 226 (1944), and in
another place suggests that if, upon trial of the case, the husband could show that the wife was not
domiciled in California, the Kansas court would not have to recognize the California divorce decree.
Certainly under Williams II, Kansas would be free to refuse full faith and credit, but the still unresolved
question is whether KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1518, gives the court this freedom. The statute says we are to
recognize the first state's decree if valid in the first state. If the first state does not require domicile, and a
few states are moving in this direction, see Note, 28 KAN. B.J. 74 (1959), the Kansas court, under the
statute, might have to recognize the decree despite the lack of domicile. The dicta in the principal case
does not raise this problem.9 ' The court properly cited Kirby v. Kirby, 143 Kan. 430, 55 P.2d 356 (1936).
174 Kan. 199, 255 P.2d 1018 (1953).
"The court, following the Kansas statute, does not mention the full faith and credit problem that
arises out of a concept of "divisable divorce." See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
For a discussion of the earlier Kansas cases in light of the Vanderbilt decision, see Comment, 6 KAN. L.
REV. 428 (1958).
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The court also held, apparently for the first time, that a nonresident may
bring suit under the Kansas separate maintenance action, KAN. G.S. 1949,
60-1516. The court points out that this action is different from an action for
divorce and that a divorce action requires that the plaintiff be a resident for a
year. Under the facts stated in the opinion, the plaintiff was not a Kansas resi-
dent at the time of filing her action under KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1516. The sepa-
rate maintenance statute by its terms imposes no limitation and the residence
statute, KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1502 speaks only in terms of divorce.
While this interpretation is probably valid, it raises some interesting ques-
tions. Does it mean that Kansas has opened its doors to the citizens of the other
forty-nine states to sue for separate maintenance whenever a nonresident wife
can serve her husband or find his property in Kansas? The implication would
certainly be yes.
Appellate Procedure
Two cases discussed elsewhere will be mentioned here. In Bunch v. Bunch9"
the court reaffirmed the rule that failure to file within ten days a notice of in-
tention to appeal a divorce decree extinguishes the right to appeal from the
divorce feature of the case. Appeal from the alimony and property portions of
the judgment does not require such notice. 4 In Goodman v. Goodman 5 plain-
tiff-wife appealed from a trial court custody order. The defendant urged that
plaintiff was in contempt of the trial court's order and therefore barred from
appealing from the order. The court did not sustain the husband's contention.
They heard the appeal. The court implied that there might be situations where
such an argument had merit.
PROPERTY RIGHTS UPON DIVORCE
Alimony, Division of Property and Child Support
Losing spouses continue to lose their appeals in the Kansas Supreme Court
when they claim that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony,
division of property and child support. In Goodman v. Goodman"8 the wife
complained that she did not get enough. 7 In Nichols v. Nichols" the husband
complained that his ex-wife got too much. 9 In refusing to reverse the trial
"' 185 Kan. 543, 343 P.2d 624 (1959).
9' The court has long considered the alimony part of a divorce action distinct and independent of the
divorce part. In an earlier rationale for this rule the court pointed out that a party could appeal from
just the alimony branch of a divorce judgment. Metcalf v. Metcalf, 132 Kan. 535, 296 Pac. 353 (1951).
t' 188 Kan. 41, 360 P.2d 877 (1961).
SId.
'She received $5,000 in alimony at $100.00 a month, and $150.00 per month child support. She
got at least half of the jointly acquired property. He was making $15,000 a year with, a car and expense
account.
186 Kan. 295, 349 P.2d 929 (1960).
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court in both cases, the supreme court points out that there is wide discretion
on the part of trial court judges.'00 To upset judicial discretion the party must
show "not merely an error in judgment, but perversity of will, passion, or
moral delinquency when such abuse is exercised to an end or purpose not
justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence."'' This is strong lan-
guage. In recent years the court seems to have abdicated to the trial courts on
the amounts in alimony, child support and property division. This is probably
good but it improperly leaves the impression that there are no standards.0 2
Even in the Nichols case the court quotes' from Carlat v. Carlat4' as to the
various tests, e.g. conduct of the parties, needs of the wife, and future earnings
of the husband. And even in Goodman, apart from the broad language, the
court, by implication, upholds an express statement by the trial judge that the
earning ability and education of the wife are important ;105 that she was partly
at fault;1°  and that she is not entitled to be supported by her husband. How-
ever, the court later cites Packard v. Packard,°7 which states that a wife is
entitled to be maintained "in as good a condition as if she were still living with
her husband,"'l 8 but then seems to distinguish the Packard case on the grounds
that the trial court has a wide discretion.
The analysis is, perhaps, a bit hazy. Discretion and standards should not be
confused. If a court applies a wrong standard, it should be reversed no matter
what its award. If it has applied the proper standard, the supreme court should
reverse only if-the trial court abused its discretion.
In Bunch v. Bunch °9 the court attempts to mitigate the artifical require-
ments established in Garver v. Garver."' In Garver the court had required the
trial court judge, when making an award in a divorce case, to lable part of
the award "alimony" and part a "division of property." This, said the court,
was required by KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1511 when the divorce was granted for the
fault of the husband."' In Bunch, the trial court awarded the wife a farm as
"a division of property and in lieu of alimony." The appellant argued that under
' She was in a wheelchair with not too much education. They had no property nor children. He
made $605 a month plus traveling expenses as an engineer. The court gave her a total of $16,000 to be
paid at $170 per month for eight months and $110 per month for a little over eleven years.
"'See also Bunch v. Bunch, 185 Kan. 543, 343 P.2d 624 (1959), decided during the survey period
which reiterates this rule. The opinion does not disclose the award made by the trial court. The supreme
court merely states that there is no abuse.
151 Goodman v. Goodman, supra note 95, at 44, 360 P.2d at 880.
"' The court has on many occasions ruled on the propriety of certain types of evidence. See, e.g.,
Leverenz v. Leverenz, 183 Kan. 79, 325 P.2d 354 (1958).
"' Nichols v. Nichols, 186 Kan. 295, 298, 349 P.2d 929, 931 (1960).
"' 168 Kan. 600, 215 P.2d 200 (1950).
"The trial judge found that she was qualified to be a journalist and that she had some interest in
being a lawyer.
Although the divorce was granted to her.
"r34 Kan. 53, 7 Pac. 628 (1885).
"'34 Kan. at 56, 7 Pac. at 626.
185 Kan. 543, 345 P.2d 624 (1959).
'4o 184 Kan. 145, 334 P.2d 408 (1959).
" For a fuller discussion of this case see Casad, Family Law, 8 KAN. L. REV. 228, 295-297 (1959),
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Garver, the court had to make a separate award. The court disagreed. It said,
turning to two pre-Garver cases:"' "[T]he failure of the judgment to so re-
flect such a definite division did not compel reversal .... It is clear the court
in the present case, while not in the best manner, did allow alimony and did
make a division of property by setting aside to plaintiff . . . farm as a division
of property and as an allowance of alimony." [Italics added.]".
Where does the court now stand? Does a trial judge have to award alimony?
Certainly the trial court can get by if it labels part of the award a division of
property and part alimony. A trial court judge might be on safe grounds if he
said: "I award this amount as a division of property and, although I am con-
sidering it, in my judicial discretion, I award nothing as alimony." But in
Bunch the court, in using the language set out above, seems to be saying that
the phrase "in lieu of" really means "and." Therefore, a trial court judge may
be in trouble if he says that he has considered alimony but in his sound judicial
discretion does not think it should be awarded."' To be on the safe side, a
trial court judge had better label part of his award alimony and a part division
of property.
Actually, this whole thing is silly and the statute ought to be changed.
Even if there are theoretical distinctions between a division of property and
alimony, the trial courts were correct when they said that under the Kansas
statute and supreme court decisions a division of property and alimony are
one and the same thing. The statute should be changed so that attorneys do
not have to double-check and make sure the trial judge properly labels his
award." 5
Contractual Control
In four cases the court was faced with an attempt by one of the parties, at
the time of the divorce, to avoid the consequences of the now popular ante or
post-nuptial property agreement. In Hoch v. Hoch,"6 the supreme court up-
held a trial court's finding that the post-nuptial separation agreement was fair
and understandingly made when the husband attacked it, while in Bremer v.
Bremer. 7 the supreme court upheld the finding that the post-nuptial contract
'Matlock v. Matlock, 182 Kan. 631, 323 P.2d 646 (1958); Meads v. Meads, 182 Kan. 361, 320
P.2d 830 (1958).
"'Actually the same trial court, Judge Raymond Carr, that decided Garver, decided Bunch. Moreover,
Bunch was decided by Judge Carr prior to the opinion in Garver. The trial court judgment in Bunch was
entered on October 16, 1958 with a new trial denied December 1, 1958. See Decree of Divorce, p. 9,
Abstract of Appellant. Garver was handed down on January 24, 1959.
'
4Note that in Grimes v. Grimes, 179 Kan. 340, 295 P.2d 646 (1956), the court required that the
trial court award alimony. However, the opinion indicates that perhaps the reversal was based on the
fact that the trial court abused its discretion.
'The 1961 edition of a leading casebook in the field, JAcoBs & GOEBEL, CAsEs AND Or-iER MATERIALS
oiw DOMESTic RELATIONS, includes the Garver case at page 761. In the note following the case the editors
comment: "[O]ne has to do with a distinction without a difference . . . .The principle case makes
mandatory the labeling of the items."
1 187 Kan. 730, 359 P.2d 839 (1961).
187 Kan. 225, 356 P.2d 672 (1960).
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was unfair on an attack by the wife, since in effect she received nothing from
the settlement. In both cases the court restates the traditional rules that to be
upheld these agreements must be fair, understandably made and entered into
without fraud or overreaching. Both cases were properly handled purely on a
fact basis. The supreme court left it to the trial court to determine the "fair-
ness" of the agreement.
But in Crosby v. Crosby,"8 the trial court got reversed. In the first Crosby
appeal," 9 discussed supra, the court held that the unstable mental condition of
the wife was a defense to the husband's charge of gross neglect. Since the trial
court had approved the post-nuptial contract between the parties on the assump-
tion that the divorce was granted to the husband, the supreme court also re-
versed the property division. Apparently acting under KAN. G.S. 1949, 69-1506,
which allows a division of property when a divorce is denied, the parties retried
the case. The trial court once again approved the agreement and the wife ap-
pealed. The supreme court frankly stated that it considered the case unique
and that "nothing would be gained by laboring our decisions or the reasons on
which the six Justices of this court participating in this opinion have unani-
mously decided this case .... "12 0 However, Chief Justice Parker then suggested
that the court felt that in a situation where (1) she had a mental illness, (2) he
knew of her condition and (3) he obtained the bulk of the property,'2' the
"execution... was not fairly and understandingly made, was not just and equit-
able . .. , and, of a certainty, was obtained by overreaching .".'. ."1" He added
that as a matter of fact, on the date she signed the agreement "she could not,
and hence did not, fairly and understandingly make the .. . post-nuptial
agreement .... "12'
If the Chief Justice had not said that the Justices disagreed, as to the reasons
for the reversal, the case might only stand for the proposition that although
Mrs. Crosby had not been declared "insane," she did not have the required
mental equipment to "understandingly" enter into the agreement. But other
possibilities also present themselves which may either broaden or limit the case.
Here, the husband obtained a disproportionate share of the property. Must
this fact exist before the court will use the mental condition of the wife as a
means of upsetting the agreement? Must the husband know of her mental
condition? If he does not, would the court still protect her? On the other hand
188 Kan. 275, 362 P.2d 3 (1961).
U Crosby v. Crosby, 186 Kan. 420, 350 P.2d 796 (1960).
1 i88 Kan. at 281, 362 P.2d at 9.
' A trust was set up for her benefit. She contributed almost all of her property, $53,000.00; while he
contributed only $25,000.00 out of property worth $410,000.00.
od., at 281, 362 P.2d at 9.
'aaId., at 282, 362 P.2d at 10. The supreme court also reversed the trial courts award of $2,000.00 to
her attorneys. There was testimony that the services were worth more than $12,800.00. Note, however,
that in reversing for the abuse of discretion the supreme court did not determine itself the proper attorney
fee. The case was returned to the trial court for its determination.
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what kind of mental condition is the court using as a yardstick? Here it seems
to find that she could not understand the nature and extent of her property. Yet
there seemed to be little evidence of this reported in the divorce case.'24 Is the
court saying that, as a matter of law, if the wife has "mental problems" a hus-
band cannot enter into a binding separation agreement with her? Suppose an
attorney for the husband wishes to settle the property rights at the time of the
divorce. The wife is unstable. He cannot have a guardian appointed for her
since she is not incompetent or insane. May he protect his client by having
available testimony, as in a deed or will case, that she knows the nature and
extent of her property or is he prohibited, as a matter of law, from entering into
the agreement?125 If the "something less than insane" test is going to be ex-
tended to property matters as well as to the area of the substantive law of the
grounds for or defenses to divorce, the court should make explicit the require-
ments.
The final case in the quartet, Bunger v. Bunger,28 is probably the most
puzzling. An ante-nuptial agreement was presented to the trial court. The
agreement provided that each party was to keep his or her own property and
the rents and profits therefrom whether the marriage ended in divorce or death
or whether there was a mere separation. A later amendment provided that
the wife should get half of the husband's property on his death.' 27 The trial
court found that the agreement was "not invalid," but since the parties had
lived together thirteen years she had acquired certain rights. In any event, the
trial court set aside to the wife some jointly acquired property, 2 ' ordered the
husband to pay $3,000.00 to the wife and gave her a judgment lien on his real
property for that amount. On appeal the husband complained that the trial
court did not follow the agreement in making these awards. The wife argued
that even though she had not complained to the trial court, the agreement
was invalid in that it tended to promote divorce.
The court sustained the trial court, but its reasoning is obscure. The court
states that the issue is the ante-nuptial agreement. It then says that it disagrees
with the defendant that the contract is void, apparently on the grounds that
the trial court found it valid and, quoting from In re Estate of Ward,129 that
' Crosby v. Crosby, 186 Kan. 420, 350 P.2d 796 (1960).
'The court, in the past, has talked about "understandingly made" in terms of her business ability
and whether or not she was represented by independent counsel. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ward, 178
Kan. 366, 285 P.2d 1081 (1955); In re Estate of Scheppel, 169 Kan. 151, 218 P.2d 192 (1950). Here the
court makes no mention of whether she was so represented. However, since the agreement was entered
into during divorce proceedings, it is more than likely, in this case, that she had counsel. Does this mean
that even if the husband's attorney makes sure she has independent counsel, he is not protected?
" 187 Kan. 642, 359 P.2d 1113 (1961).
'51 In his opinion, Justice Robb does not set out the terms of the agreement. The agreement is found
in appellant's abstract.
" The agreement apparently provided that jointly acquired property should be held in joint tenancy.
The supreme court made no mention of this part of the trial court's judgment.
' 178 Kan. 360, 285 P.2d 1081 (1955).
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there was consideration. The court does not mention the pro-motion of divorce
idea. Yet in Fencham v. Fencham3 ° a divided court found that an ante-nuptial
contract, providing that the wife was to receive $2,000.00 if they separated, was
against public policy and void since it tended to promote separation and divorce.
The principle case, also concerning an ante-nuptial contract, provided that
upon divorce or separation she would get none of his property while she would
get one-half if she remained with him until his death. The wife's attorney
argued that the reason the husband sued for divorce was to insure that she
would not receive one-half of his estate. The court does not mention Fencham,
although cited by both sides in the brief.
However, since the court in its opinion does not cite Fencham nor mention
the fact that the husband argued that the contract was void because it tended
to promote divorce, the principle case surely cannot be taken as overruling
Fencham and allowing parties, in an ante-nuptial agreement, to determine
property rights on separation and divorce.' Actually, the court protects the
principle of Fencham by assuming, in the opinion, that the trial court could
treat the rights of the parties as if they were governed by KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-
1511,132 and not by the contract. The court cited Garver v. Garver... and talked
about the discretion lodged in trial courts in making a division of property.
The court does say that the trial court did not change or modify the agreement.
Comparing the agreement, the trial court's judgment, and the supreme court's
opinion certainly leaves the impression that the trial court did award the wife
an additional amount in order to prevent the husband from using a divorce to
prohibit her from taking her one-half share as provided in the agreement. The
result is a holding that an ante-nuptial agreement attempting to control a
division of property and alimony is not binding. The opinion, however, leaves
undecided the issue of whether the agreement is "void" or just "not binding"
on a trial court.
The court decided one other case involving an attempt by the parties to
control their property rights at the time of divorce. Here, however, child sup-
port, not inter-spouse rights, was the sole controversy. The result is probably
good, but the handling of prior authority leaves much to be desired. In Grunder
v. Grunder34 the court emphatically held, citing Phillips v. Phillips,185 that a
iM 160 Kan. 683, 165 P.2d 209 (1946).
" On other occasions the court has ignored a provision in a separation agreement that a wife could
receive a certain amount at the husband's death provided the parties had not separated or divorced at
that time. In In re Estate of Neis, 170 Kan. 254, 225 P.2d 110 (1950), the court allowed the wife, at his
death, the amount set out in the contract. Neither side argued, apparently, the invalidity of the provision.
In Benjamin v. Benjamin, 197 Misc. 618, 95 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1950) afl'd per curiam, 302 N.Y. 560 (1951),
such agreement was upheld against contention that it violated public policy. Perhaps the court is making
a shift. However, an attorney should be extremely careful in an ante-nuptial agreement when trying to
excuse support if the parties separate or are divorced.
.. This section provides for division of property and alimony when there is no agreement.
184 Kan. 145, 334 P.2d 408 (1959).
186 Kan. 766, 352 P.2d 1067 (1960).
163 Kan. 710, 186 P.2d 102 (1947).
1961]
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separation agreement purporting to fix the amount of child support was not
binding on the court. The court pointed out that KAN. G.S. 1959 Supp., 60-
1510, provides that a trial court shall have discretion to modify custody and
child support orders as the need of the child varies. To allow the patries to set
a binding support order would oust the jurisdiction given the court under KAN.
G.S. 1959 Supp., 60-1510. This, said the court, was not proper. There should be
no quarrel with this result. The legislature has determined, and probably wisely,
that support, as well as custody, should be variable as the needs of the child
change. 38 This opinion puts the court in at least a consistent position. It has
long held that the custody of a child is not subject to contractual control by the
18Tparties. 8
But in reaching this result, the court, by ignoring earlier precedent, raised
some new problems. Some time ago, the court held that in a separation agree-
ment the parties might provide for variable alimony despite the fact that KAN.
G.S. 1949, 60-1511, provides for a fixed and permanent alimony award. At-
torneys, with the approval of the court, did this by having the contract approved
and not merged in the decree."8' If merged, the contract was void, but if only
approved, the contract controlled. In the so-called first Feldman case... the
court found a merger of an indefinite amount, but wanting to uphold the con-
tract, distinguished the merger cases by saying that here the payment was to
the wife for her support and the support of the child. Therefore, it was not
alimony and it made no difference that it was for an indefinite amount. Later,
in French v. French4 the court got off the track. It held that a trial court did
not have the power to reduce child support payments after an agreement was
entered into-the agreement arising after the decree. The court relied on
earlier cases that had said that the husband could not be sued for non-payment
of the amount set out in the original decree after a wife had agreed to accept
a lesser amount.
Then in the second Feldman case' the court was faced with this same con-
tract that provided for indefinite payments to the wife for her support and for
the support of the child. The trial court had reduced the payments at a hearing
subsequent to the original decree. The supreme court, citing the French case as
an alternative holding, said specifically that the contract controlled over KAN.
G.S. 1959 Supp., 60-1510, and that the court had no jurisdiction to reduce child
support payments in face of the contract. 4
" See, for further arguments, Hopson, Family Law, 5 KAN. L. REv. 255, 269 (1956).
' See, e.g., Leach v. Leach, 179 Kan. 557, 296 P.2d 1078 (1956); Wood v. Shaw, 92 Kan. 70, 139
Pac. 1165 (1914).MSee Note, 1 KAN. L. REv. 199 (1953), where the technique is explained and the two lines of
authorities discussed.
'
t Feldman v. Feldman, 166 Kan. 699, 204 P.2d 724 (1949).
'o 171 Kan. 76, 229 P.2d 1014 (1951).
" Feldman v. Feldman, 179 Kan. 109, 292 P.2d 716 (1956).
m The syllabus reads: "In this jurisdiction, where a husband and wife have entered into a marriage
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But in this latest case, the Grunder case, the court distinguished the French
case and the three cases the court relied on in French by saying that these cases
involved post-decree agreements whereas Grunder did not. Yet the court
neither discussed nor even cited the first or second Feldman case which did not
involve a post-decree agreement and which purported to hold that the support
contract binds the court.
Where does an attorney now stand, when trying to negotiate a binding
child support agreement? Certainly Grunder is a specific holding that a con-
tract, as to child support, is not binding on a trial court that wishes to later
reduce child support payments. With this specific holding in mind, a first
reaction would be that Feldman was overruled, even though the court did not
mention it. 4' This is probably the result of Grunder. However, the court may
have inadvertently established three classes of support orders in this state.
(1) Alimony agreements: These awards must be definite if merged into the
decree, but may be indefinite if only approved. They are not subject to later
modification. (2) Semi-support agreements: These agreements provide for the
payment to the wife for her support and for the support of the children. They
may be indefinite even though merged in the decree and apparently, if Feldman
is not overruled, may not be later modified by the trial court. (3) Old-fashioned
child support agreements: These agreements, apparently, are not binding on
the trial court either at the first hearing or later if the court desires to modify
the agreement. Surely it would be better to specifically overrule Feldman and
eliminate the concept of a "semi-support" agreement.
Post Judgment Collections
Alimony payments in the hands of the clerk of a district court are subject
to garnishment. In so holding, Mannel v. Mannel'" overruled H. & M. Tire
Serv. Co. v. Combs.'45 The 1934 Combs case was based on KAN. G.S. 1949,
60-955. This statute provides in part that no judgment shall be rendered on the
liability of a garnishee by reason of any money in his hands and for which he
is accountable as a public officer. In 1945, KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-965 was passed.
It provides that money in custodia legis may be garnished. The court applied
the rule that the later statute controls where there is an irreconcilable statutory
conflict.
settlement whereby they agree upon a division of property as between themselves and payments to be made
by the husband to the wife for the care and support of their children, including maintenance of the wife
while such children remain in her care and custody, and thereafter such agreement is approved by the
trial court in a divorce action and made a part of its judgment and decree, the rights and liabilities of
such parties are governed by the terms of the contract, not by the statutory authority of the court in
divorce cases." Feldman v. Feldman, 179 Kan. 109, 292 P.2d 716 (1956). For a fuller discussion of
these cases, see Hopson, Family Law, 5 KAN. L. REv. 268 (1956).
'", In defense of the court, it might be mentioned that the attorneys in the Grunder case did not cite
the Feldman case in their briefs.
' 186 Kan. 150, 348 P.2d 626 (1960).
24 140 Kan. 35, 34 P.2d 943 (1934).
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Smith v. Smith146 presents a novel question. Plaintiff had secured a divorce
and an alimony judgment in the amount of $13,068 from the defendant, pay-
able at the rate of $108 a month. The divorce decree contained a provision that
on default of any monthly installment "the entire balance shall become due...
and plaintiff shall be entitled to foreclose" the lien on the real estate securing
the alimony payments. The evidence was that the defendant got sick and
missed payments for about two and one-half months. The defendant's evidence
was that the plaintiff told defendant's present wife that missing the payments
was all right if they were made up. With defendant $274 in arrears the plain-
tiff filed her motion to have the entire balance declared due under the accelera-
tion clause and to foreclose the real estate lien. Before the motion was heard the
defendant paid up the delinquent alimony. The motion was overruled and
appealed. The supreme court held that the appellant had waived her right to
insist upon full maturity under the acceleration clause by orally agreeing to
accept payment later.
The appellee had urged the court to consider the effect of the subsequent
catch-up payments. The opinion observes that in Kansas such payments do not
bar application of the acceleration clause in note and mortgage cases.147 The
court declined to decide whether they would apply this rule to acceleration
clauses in judgments.
In Kessler v. Kessler,'48 the court held that attorney fees are allowable to
an insane wife enforcing a judgment against her former husband for support
under KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1501. The court observed that the statute places the
insane spouse in the same category as dependent minor children. The provision
for the support of the insane person is enforceable the same as in child support
cases.
Three cases in this area involving child support merit only passing mention.
In Geiss v. Geiss49 the court held that a father's fraudulent conveyance, seeking
to avoid child support payments, was subject to attack by the minor son nine
years later. The child's rights during infancy were not affected by the statute of
limitations. Dicta in Fangrow, v. Fangrow5 ° reaffirmed the principle that
delinquent child support installments become final judgments and a lien upon
the real estate of the debtor father. Hains v. Hains.5 ' was a proceeding in which
the divorced wife asked to have unpaid child support converted into a judg-
ment. It was held: (1) that no obligation accrued for payments in months
where the trial court had not ordered payments even though the father (given
144 186 Kan. 728, 352 P.2d 1056 (1960).
"Miles v. Hamilton, 106 Kan. 804, 189 Pac. 926 (1920).
"' 188 Kan. 255, 362 P.2d 21 (1961).
149 186 Kan. 37, 348 P.2d 643 (1960).
SW 185 Kan. 227, 341 P.2d 998 (1959).
'a 187 Kan. 379, 357 P.2d 317 (1960).
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custody through the summer) left children with the mother during summer
months, and (2) voluntary summer payments could not later be credited against
unpaid winter installments.
This last point raises a difficult question. By court order the husband was
required to make payments for nine months out of the year. He fell in arrears
before making the voluntary summer payments. In this situation is the husband
making catch-up payments or voluntary contributions? Safe procedure requires
a statement in the record concerning the application of excess payments.
The Hains case raises another question. The defendant had filed a motion
asking that unpaid child support in the sum of $2,300 "be converted into a
judgment in order that execution could issue thereon." The plaintiff filed a
motion to set the judgment aside. Acting on this motion the trial court modified
the previous judgment. Procedurally, both parties acted incorrectly. Quoting
from Hains, "The rule that each child support payment which becomes due
and remains unpaid constitutes a final judgment was stated in Oretz v. Ortez,
180 Kan. 334, 304 P.2d 490, where it was also stated that a district court is
without power to change or modify orders for past due installments for the
support and education of minor children." '152 The delinquent payment is a
final judgment which the court is without power to modify. If a dispute arises
over the amount of the judgment, how do the parties bring the dispute before
the court?
Effect of Judgment
Although more of a property problem than a "family law" problem, two
survey period cases may pose a real threat to the marketability of certain titles.
Suppose a client and his wife owned some savings bonds or a piece of
property as joint tenants and not as tenants in common. There is a divorce
decree and nothing is said about the bonds or the land. The husband dies. Does
his administrator get half or does the wife get it all? Two Kansas cases, while
maybe not controlling, must be considered in passing any abstract. In Carson,
Ex'x v. Ellis.. the parties owned a duplex. The divorce decree embodied a
separation agreement and in addition there was a post-divorce agreement which,
after some difficulty, the court found severed the joint tenancy and turned it
into a tenancy in common.'54 But, as an alternative ground for the holding, the
court talked about the four unities needed for joint tenancy and said that the
divorce decree itself destroyed the joint tenancy. The court talked about the
fact that the trial court under KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1511 is required to make a
division of property. The implication was that the statute effects the severance.
' Id., at 381, 357 P.2d at 319.
186 Kan. 112, 348 P.2d 807 (1960).




Then in Baade v. Ratner.5 the court was faced with a claim by the surviving
spouse to a joint account in a savings and loan association. Again, there was a
property settlement and the decree specifically provided that the deceased
husband was to receive the $1,000 in the account. However, after the divorce
someone deposited another $2,000. After the husband died, the wife claimed
the account, since the title had never been changed at the saving and loan as-
sociation. The supreme court, reversing the trial court, said that she did not
have title. The decree and the agreement not only gave the husband the $1,000
but also severed the account. On the facts, the Baade case is clearer in that the
decree came closer to giving title in the whole account to the husband. But the
court again quoted the language from the Carson case to the effect that the
court shall make a division of property and that the divorce decree severed the
joint tenancy.
If a divorce decree itself severs a joint tenancy when the property is not
mentioned in the decree, an attorney may have a problem passing title in certain
cases. Of course, the court could always fall back on the fact that in these two
cases the parties agreed to destroy the joint tenancy, so if there was no agree-
ment, the attorney could conclude that title vested in the joint tenant when
there was no agreement. Yet in both cases the court added that the divorce de-
cree itself severed it. So, does an attorney dare pass title if nothing is said ? If the
test for marketability is "no reasonable doubt,"1 'e an attorney probably should
not pass title. Surely these two cases raise a reasonable doubt. As a preventive
measure, an attorney should have any property held in joint tenancy specifically
taken care of in the divorce decree.
INCOMPETENT PERSONS
In In re Estate of Diebolt157 the court severely limited the apparent breadth
of In re Estate of Correll."8 In Correll the court held that under KAN. G.S.
1949, 59-2007, the superintendent of any Kansas mental institution could dis-
charge an inmate "as restored to capacity" and the probate court had to so
order under KAN. G.S. 1949, 59-2276, despite the fact that KAN. G.S. 1949, 59-
2268 provided a method whereby the probate court, on petition, could restore
to capacity and the fact that restoration of capacity was assumed to be a judicial
function. Although the case arose in terms of the meaning of the word "cured"
in a will, the court had used broad language in defining the power of the
superintendents. The court pointed out that our state hospitals were staffed
iM 187 Kan. 741, 359 P.2d 877 (1961).
'
5 Sohmeyer v. Bower, 170 Kan. 442, 227 P.2d 102 (1951); Peathing v. Baird, 168 Kan. 528, 213
P.2d 1015 (1950).
.' 187 Kan. 2, 353 P.2d 803 (1960).
15 178 Kan. 618, 290 P.2d 1050 (1955).
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with good people. Therefore it was logical for the legislature to turn this power
over to hospital people as well as to the probate court... ..
But then in Diebolt, an attorney argued that to allow the superintendent to
make this determination violated due process and would be an unlawful
delegation of judicial power. The court upheld the statute but to do so, had to
narrowly construe the statute and distinguish Correll.'59 The court found that
the only power the superintendent has is the power to find, for the purpose of
protection of society and the individual concerned, that the individual is re-
stored to capacity sufficiently to allow for discharge. 6 ° Such a finding and the
order entered by the probate court pursuant thereto under KAN. G.S. 1949, 59-
2276, therefore is limited to restraint of liberty. It has no effect on the power
of the probate court to discharge or not discharge the guardian of the person
or estate. Apparently to obtain restoration of these rights KAN. G.S. 1949, 59-
2268 must be used.
The Diebolt decision is a sound result. It keeps for the judiciary the final
determination of capacity for legal rights while leaving to the psychiatrists the
determination of the desirability of hospitalization. Correll's implication that
the psychiatrists should have the power to determine legal capacity is now
dispelled.
LEGISLATION
The 1961 session of the legislature effected several statutory changes which
will be noted.' KAN. G.S. 1959 Supp., 38-823 allowed a juvenile judge to order
confinement of an alleged delinquent child in the county jail or police station
pending a hearing. The new section expands this power to alleged miscreants.
It then added that both delinquent and miscreant juveniles who were con-
10 The court suggests that it may add or subtract words or clauses in order to hold a statute constitu-
tional, 187 Kan. at 13, 353 P.2d at 814.
' The court's opinion is a wonderful example of the use of legislative history to reconstrue the
"plain meaning" of the statute.
""These other minor statutory changes were also enacted. The provision of KAN. G.S. 1949, 23-116,
requiring the person performing a marriage ceremony to return the license to the probate judge of the
proper county was deleted. Kan. Sess. Laws 1961, c. 191. This section had duplicated KAN. G.S. 1949,
23-109, which requires the license to be returned in ten days. In the probate code, section 59-1804 was
amended. Concerning the duties of a guardian of a ward, the limit on the amount of funds that may be
deposited in any one savings and loan association was raised from $5,000 to $10,000. A new provision
was added providing that a guardian "may deposit the funds of said ward under a time deposit or a
savings account of an insured bank within the state of Kansas." Kan. Sess. Laws 1961, c. 269. In section
59-2261, providing for selection of jurors in a jury trial in an insanity commitment, the requirement that
one juror, "be a duly licensed doctor of medicine to be selected by the court," was amended to one,
"licensed to practice medicine and surgery by the state board of healing arts to be selected by the
court." Kan. Sess. Laws 1961, c. 270.
KAN. G.S. 1959 Supp., 65-504, provides for the licensing of maternity hospitals and children's homes
by the state board of health. The 1961 legislature enacted provisions setting out the procedure for an
appeal from a refusal by the board. Kan. Sess. Laws 1961, c. 285. The 1961 session also specifically
designated the state board of social welfare as the agency charged with the administration of the
state's mental health program. Kan. Sess. Laws 1961, c. 403. And a section was passed giving the state
director of institutions the power to transfer inmates between state institutions operated by the. depart-
men of social welfare. Kan. Sess. Laws 1961, c. 434.
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fined in jail under this section had to be separated from adults. Kan. Sess. Laws
1961, c. 228. KAN. G.S. 1949, 39-401 thru -414, relating to the hospital treatment
of children and dependent persons, were repealed."6 2 This area is now covered
by the juvenile code.1"'
l'Kan. Sess. Laws 1961, c. 229.
l Sec KAN. G.S. 1959 Supp., 38-824.
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